Stalin at this time all not yet felt a great need for qualified advice of military specialists and was mesmerized by the amount of cash divisions, without taking into account their actual combat power. However, this was like Hitler to Stalin. German plans attack on a large differ 1942 adventurousness. Winter offensive of the Red Army were in full off-road, which was not possible to quickly carry out operations in deep environment and the defeat of German compounds. The offensive was carried out on the tactics of World War I: infantry and cavalry, supported by artillery, that in the winter, a chilling maneuver off the roads to cover up their strong points German defense, led only to oust the Germans from the settlements (in the military reports of those years are referred to in the first place the name of the liberated smaller settlements, rather than the number of German prisoners of war), and This Red Army suffered heavy losses. While systemically front operations command and Headquarters of the Western Front was not planned, and local military operations to capture the individual settlements (and even cities), greater efficiency and the more strategic success – a major defeat of the enemy – do not bring. Neglect of Stalin functions of the General Staff has led to poor proschitannosti (in terms of supply by elongating the advancing communications in almost winter road connections) of the planned offensive. In the end, despite the unparalleled heroism of the advancing Soviet troops in the harshest winter conditions January 1942, thanks to the absence of the necessary supply of planned results are not achieved.